Current research on antidumping suggests a number of channels through which antidumping affects the volume of world trade. This paper uses a structural approach to the gravity model framework to evaluate these hypotheses using data on trade volume over the period 1948 to 2001. We conclude that the volume and welfare effects have been negative but quite modest.
I. Introduction
A S with the wave of interest in the "new protection" in the 1970s, we are now observing a new wave of concern with a rapid increase in the use of "nontraditional" protectionist instruments (Prusa, 2001; Zanardi, 2006) . Once again, the main culprit is contingent protection (primarily antidumping and countervailing duties, though voluntary export restraints-mainly coming from the safeguards processalso figured prominently in the 1970s). 1 The main difference is that in the 1970s, the main users were industrial countries (mainly the United States, European Union, Canada, and Australia), the millennial new users, and the main source of growth in use, are developing countries and countries in transition (Argentina, Brazil, India, Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey) . 2 In this paper, we are primarily concerned with the impact of the spread of antidumping on trade.
Before turning to a discussion of the main issues, we can fix the essential facts drawing on an excellent paper by Zanardi (2006) . Zanardi shows a strong upward trend in investigations and a more moderate rate of growth in the number of antidumping orders in place. Furthermore, although there may be some downward trend in the use of contingent protection by traditional users, the trend in new users is strongly upward. This suggests the potential for very wide adoption and use of these mechanisms. 3 While the spread of contingent protection mechanisms, and their use, is an undeniable fact, the scale of their use and their effect on aggregate trade and welfare are considerably less certain. The public rhetoric, as well as that in much of the academic research on antidumping, could easily give the impression that these effects are sizable. In this paper, we develop a framework within which we can evaluate most of the common hypotheses relating to the aggregate effects of antidumping.
Our analysis is based on the gravity model framework, which has become a standard tool in establishing an empirical baseline for the analysis of equilibrium trade patterns and deviations therefrom (Feenstra, 2004) . Such a baseline needs, in principle, to reflect the underlying general equilibrium of the world trading system. Early attempts to identify deviations generated by the presence of various forms of protection sought to use the structure provided by the Heckscher-Ohlin model but did not appear to produce convincing results (Leamer, 1987 (Leamer, , 1990 . With the development of theoretical foundations for the gravity model, along with its statistical success in accounting for trade patterns, the gravity model has increasingly become the econometric framework of choice when seeking to analyze deviations from expected trade between two countries. 4 More recently, the gravity model has also been used to evaluate the effect of fundamental institutions such as the WTO and various forms of preferential trade and currency arrangement. 5 In the next section, we develop the motivation for our analysis of the link between antidumping and trade volume, followed by a presentation of our theoretical and econometric framework. Then we present our empirical results and robustness in the following sections. More specifically, the theoretical and empirical literature on which we draw suggests a number of causal channels by which antidumping can 3 This appears to be even more the case in the face of the current economic crisis. On the one hand, as Bown (2009) showed and as one would expect from previous research showing a strong response of protection in general, and antidumping in particular, to economic downturn, both developed and developing countries have increased their use of contingent protection. However, it is even more striking how muted this protectionist response has been. 4 The key papers providing theoretical foundations for the gravity model are Anderson (1979) , Bergstrand (1985 Bergstrand ( , 1989 , and Deardorff (1998) . The industry standard, on which we also rely, is Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) . Wall (1999) provides a useful discussion of the gravity model as a framework for evaluating the effect of protection on trade. 5 For instance, Rose (2004a Rose ( , 2004b finds that membership in the WTO has no systematic effect on trade pattern, while Subramanian and Wei (2007) find that WTO membership exerts a powerful and positive impact on trade for a subset of countries that adopt liberalizing policies as part of accession to the WTO. Baldwin (1994) , Frankel (1997) , and Baier and Bergstrand (2007) use the gravity model to examine the trade effects of regional trading blocs, while the results in Frankel and Rose (2002) , Rose (2000) , and Rose and Van Wincoop (2001) point to the relevance of (various forms of) currency arrangements on trade volume. affect trade patterns. Many papers just list these in an essentially ad hoc way to suggest that antidumping should reduce trade (Vandenbussche & Zanardi, 2006) . By contrast, we are able to link each of these to specific predictions that can be evaluated in the context of our gravity model. With minor variation across the various hypotheses, our results show uniformly low but negative effects of antidumping on aggregate trade patterns. Because we have adopted a structural framework, we are able to report comparative static estimates of the effect of antidumping on trade volumes (section VD) and present estimates of the welfare effects of antidumping (section VI). In addition to the sensitivity analysis we provide with respect to econometric specification, in section VII, we also apply our analysis to three sectors that are known to face heavy use of antidumping: iron and steel, other metals, and chemicals. Finally, in section VIII, we divide our sample into developing and developed countries to look for evidence of country heterogeneity. For neither sectors nor countries do we find evidence of heterogeneity in the coefficient estimates. Note that this does not say that there is not heterogeneity across sectors or countries in use of antidumping. There is: given the nature of our model, homogeneous parameters are associated with heterogeneous comparative static effect, and, of course, heterogeneity in use. We see this in section VII, where we use our structural framework to calculate the effect of the level of antidumping applied by a developing country that is a heavy user of antidumping (India). There we find that the welfare cost is three times higher than for the United States, though still quite modest.
II. The Link between Antidumping and Trade Volume
The literature on the economics and political economy of antidumping (AD) is large, but we can identify four classes of channel through which AD affects trade volumes: 6 direct protection effects, effects due to the contingent nature of protection, effects due to the non-MFN nature of protection, and effects due to the firm-specific nature of protection. We consider each in turn.
Direct effects of protection recognize that AD tariffs are protection, and protection reduces trade volumes and welfare. 7 As with all other forms of protection, a variety of strong cases can be made against protection as a policy instrument 6 For surveys of the work on antidumping, see Blonigen and Prusa (2003) , Falvey and Nelson (2006) , and Nelson (2006) . 7 In our usage, direct effects refer to any effects induced by the standard, and aggregate effects of antidumping as protection. A referee reminds us that antidumping, in common with any other form of protection, might work through a variety of other mechanisms. First, downstream effects might induce increased imports of the good due to either declining competitiveness of the domestic industry or increased competitiveness (especially moving up the value chain) of the foreign industry. Alternatively, antidumping jumping by foreign multinationals might reduce imports by providing domestic supply and by joining a protectionist coalition to further reduce imports. Overall, we are predisposed to see these effects as rather small. That, however, is an empirical question. These remain direct effects, and we will try to evaluate them. for most uses. In particular, protection distorts incentives, leading to suboptimal use of scarce national resources. Especially in the context of very low statutory rates of protection, the often very high rates of contingent protection can imply substantial distortion. These effects should cause reduced trade between the country imposing the duty and the exporter to that country's market. However, the measured aggregate effects are rather low. Rough-and-ready analyses for the case of the United States suggest that the welfare cost of AD may be as low as $2 billion to $4 billion for the United States in 1993 (Gallaway, Blonigen, & Flynn, 1999) . 8 This is hardly surprising since the amount of trade directly affected by contingent protection is quite small-less than 5% of trade flows. 9 A related direct effect has to do with retaliation. Following research on retaliation in general models of protection, recent research has suggested that the trade volume effects (and welfare effects) of protection could be worse if the trading partner retaliates (Prusa & Skeath, 2002) . On the other hand, as Blonigen and Bown (2003) argue, protection may be less likely in a dyad where both parties possess an AD mechanism. In the latter case, then, the spread of AD would be trade increasing.
Beyond the standard problems with protection, there are three additional classes of issues more or less unique to AD: one directly related to its contingent nature, a second related to its non-most favored-nation (MFN) nature; and a third related to its firm-specific nature. Because contingent protection is contingent on an administrative decision, it is in its nature uncertain. A foreign firm currently facing statutory protection would presumably prefer a positive probability of the fixed level of protection to that fixed level of protection with certainty (because the expected level of protection would be lower), but given the support of tariffs that the AD authorities draw from, they may well be averse to a more general AD duty lottery (that is, a lottery where both the outcome and the final rate are uncertain). Furthermore, firms that are not exposed to a statutory tariff will be unambiguously negatively affected by exposure to AD risk. There is considerable anecdotal evidence that foreign firms do in fact price in such a way as to avoid AD risk (though, for obvious reasons, there is essentially no systematic evidence on the extent of this practice). Nonetheless, it is perfectly plausible that protection against one line of goods from a given exporter, i, could have effects on exports of other goods from i, the same line of goods from other countries, and even producers of other goods from other countries. The breadth of this effect leads Vandenbussche and Zanardi (2006) to refer to this as the "global chilling effect" of AD.
A third source of concern is that AD protection, because it responds to exports from specific countries, violates the fundamental GATT/WTO commitment to nondiscrimination by the MFN clause in article 1 of the GATT agreement. As an empirical matter, the problem of non-MFN protection is that the overall effects are ambiguous. Even if we presume that the net effect of an AD duty on total imports from the home country of firms named in the AD complaint is negative (as seems plausible, but which we can test for), the effect on exports from nonnamed firms, and especially firms from nonnamed countries, is not at all clear. On the one hand, Prusa (2001) finds that in addition to suppressing imports from named countries, AD protection seems to increase imports from nonnamed countries (this would be the equivalent of "trade diversion"). In addition, Bown and Crowley (2006, 2007) also find trade deflection (restricted exporters increase their exports to unrestricted third markets). On the other hand, where Bown and Crowley focus on the effects of AD duties on the export behavior of firms from a single country (Japan), Prusa (2001) and Vandenbussche and Zanardi (2006) argue that, for essentially the reasons outlined above, the active use of AD is expected to generally reduce imports.
Finally, as we have noted already, AD is firm-specific protection. Filing an AD complaint has positive costs, so we must presume that the expected gain from such a filing is positive. These gains may flow directly from filing or from the expected grant of protection. An enormous literature has sought to explicate and empirically identify these gains. 10 For home firms, the benefits of filing come in the form of harassment or, in a strategic context, signaling or raising rivals' costs. 11 Similarly, the benefits of a positive expectation of an AD duty flow from standard distributional effects of protection, rent-shifting, or supporting collusion like Krishna's (1989) trade restrictions as facilitating devices. Given the number of potential strategic variables and market structures, it is probably not surprising that virtually any outcome is possible here. Although there is some, usually rather indirect, evidence that such collusion may be present, identifying 10 Much contemporary research, both theoretical and empirical, has focused on the strategic elements of administered protection, concluding that the costs of administered protection are probably far in excess of those implied by simply looking at amounts of trade covered by dumping orders and levels of protection in those lines. Surveys of this work can be found in Blonigen and Prusa (2003) and Nelson (2006) . 11 There is some evidence of a harassment motivation, though the most sophisticated attempt to identify such a motivation found only a very small number of cases of this sort (Staiger & Wolak, 1994 . One channel through which the presence of a contingent protection mechanism affects outcomes, even if we do not observe cases filed, is that firms may alter their strategic behavior to take into account the possibility of filing a case. Because such behavior distorts the allocation of resources, it has been called indirect rent seeking (Leidy, 1994) . For example, foreign firms may compete less aggressively so as to avoid an antidumping complaint. In addition to changing the terms of noncooperative interaction between home and foreign firms, it is also quite possible that the presence of contingent protection may support collusion among home and foreign firms where, once again, we need not observe contingent protection in equilibrium. magnitudes (or even direction of effect) has proved virtually impossible. 12 In the next section we develop our empirical framework. Following that, we suggest how each of the above effects can be identified within that framework.
III. An Empirical Gravity Model for Panel Data
We consider an N country world where each country has a representative consumer whose preferences are given by a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) utility function reflecting a love of variety (see Dixit & Stiglitz, 1977; Krugman, 1979) . 13 That is, the utility of a representative consumer in country j is given by
where σ is the elasticity of substitution, c ij is the consumption by consumers in j of a single product originating in i, and β i is a distribution parameter that is inversely related to country i's fraction of world endowments. The budget constraint of consumers in j may be written as
where Y j is country j's income (GDP), p i is the mill price of differentiated products in i, and t ij ≥ 1 is a trade cost index 12 While this work is clever and suggests a warning that standard measures of the cost of protection may be substantial underestimates of those costs, it is important to recognize that there is virtually no compelling empirical work here. In fact, there is a somewhat awkward tension between this conclusion and the work, from an antitrust perspective, which suggests that most cases could not pass a first-stage Joskow-Klevorik predation test (Shin, 1998) . That is, most cases do not seem to involve the kind of market structure that would permit antitrust action. It is possible that the cases not filed (those in which the presence of the threat of an antidumping case supports collusion) really do yield high costs, but this seems improbable. It is ironic that in a literature that stresses the disconnect between norms in antitrust and norms in contingent protection, the implicit presumption among antidumping scholars is the Harvard presumption (that markets are presumed imperfectly competitive-mainly because this raises the costs of antidumping) rather than the Chicago presumption (that the market is presumed competitive).
While it may be true that most sectors involved in antidumping are broadly competitive and thus unlikely to support collusive activity, some sectors might well have such market structures. If these sectors account for a large number of cases, collusion and predation might play a significant role in the aggregate effects of antidumping. There is certainly some evidence that this is the case in the chemical industry (Bernhofen, 1995 (Bernhofen, , 1996 (Bernhofen, , 1998 . Iron and steel, the other leading user of antidumping worldwide, is a harder case. For steel, the evidence is that it is precisely the increasing competitiveness of the industry that led to its problems and its use of antidumping (Nelson, 1996) . Ultimately this is an empirical question. In fact, we are testing for whether these sectors respond differently to antidumping than other sectors do (see table 5 ), as they must if this hypothesis is correct. The short answer is that there is no evidence that these sectors respond distinctively to antidumping. 13 In contrast to Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Krugman (1979) , we model countries here as endowment economies, as in Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) . Hence, we do not introduce separate variables for the number of firms in each economy, but we use the distribution parameter β i to indicate a country's mass in world supply. such that t ij −1 is the fraction of consumer prices that accrues to (tariff and nontariff) trade costs. Maximizing equation (1) subject to equation (2) determines the aggregate demand of consumers in j for goods from i at market prices as
where the aggregate price of the consumption bundle of consumers in j under CES preferences (P j ) is determined as
( 4 )
In an important contribution, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) illustrate how the condition of goods market clearing
X ij , together with that of symmetric trade frictions t ij = t ji , may be used to reformulate equation (3) as
expressions for price indices P i , P j that obey goods market clearing can be found as
Since the price index functions in equation (6) are nonlinear in both trade frictions and the parameters, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) derive a nonlinear estimation procedure that obtains estimates of the impact of trade frictions on trade volumes. 14 Recently, Baier and Bergstrand (2009) suggested using a log-linear first-order Taylor series approximation of the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) model. An advantage of the latter approach is its computational simplicity and its performance, which has been shown to obtain parameter estimates that are very close to the ones relying on the nonlinear 14 Their focus is on the border effect for trade across U.S. states and Canadian provinces relative to intranational trade among these regions. However, the argument naturally extends to estimating the impact of trade frictions on trade volumes in such a model in general. procedure. Baier and Bergstrand rewrite the price index terms in equation (6) as
and then apply a first-order log-linear Taylor series expansion centered at the symmetric, nonzero trade cost equilibrium with cross-section data, t ij = t = 1 and P i = P = t 1 2 = 1. 15 This yields the following approximate log-inverse price index expressions corresponding to equation (7) for a symmetric world with trade frictions:
The first-order Taylor series approximation to the gravity model, evaluated at symmetric but nonzero trade frictions, for bilateral panel data in logs then reads
Note that we have outlined only the deterministic part of the model in this analysis. We follow the majority of previous work on the estimation of bilateral trade flow models by assuming that the stochastic part is linearly separable in a specification in logs as in equation (9). 16 With panel data, the stochastic part of the model (we refer to it as u ijt ) distinguishes two components: one that is constant across periods (the between-country pairs dimension of the data) and the remaining part (the within-country-pairs dimension of the data, which Glick and Rose, 2002 , refer to as the time series dimension). In formal accounts, the overall stochastic component for country pair ij and year t may be written as
Clearly, μ ij is the time-invariant part of the error term, while ν ijt is an idiosyncratic disturbance term. There are two main options for modeling μ ij . First, assume a specific functional form μ ij could be modeled as random. However, for this to obtain consistent model parameter estimates, all observables included in the model have to be independent not only of ν ijt but also of μ ij . Otherwise the parameter estimates are biased and inconsistent. Second, one can estimate the parameter μ ij for each country pair ij. Obviously this is less efficient than assuming μ ij as random. Implicitly, it means that we have to estimate not only a single constant for the model but one for each country pair. Since the number of country pairs is much larger than the available time periods in typical gravity models, the parameters μ ij will be highly inaccurate. However, usually we are interested not in the estimates of μ ij but in the parameters of the covariates in the model. While their parameters will also be less accurate than in a model where μ ij is random, the fixed country pair effects estimator is immune to the problem of possible correlation between the covariates and the μ ij . Therefore, the model with a fixed μ ij is a benchmark case, and the one with a random μ ij needs to obtain parameter estimates for the covariates that are very similar to the fixed μ ij estimator. Hence, the reliability of the random country pair effects model is testable (see Hausman, 1978) , and with bilateral trade volume data, it is typically significantly rejected against its fixed country pair effects counterpart (see Glick & Rose, 2002; Cheng & Wall, 2005) . While this might be seen as a problem of panel data, in fact it raises serious concerns only about parameters in cross-section models. The random country pair effects estimator can be shown to be a weighted average of the fixed country pair effects model and a time-averaged cross-section model (see Baltagi, 2005) . Under the outlined assumptions, rejection of the random effects model due to correlation between the covariates and the μ ij implies that the cross-section estimates are biased and inconsistent. Since previous evidence on gravity models points in that direction, we focus on panel econometric fixed-effects estimates throughout. While ours is not the first attempt to apply such techniques in the context of gravity models, their introduction in the literature on the quantification of trade volume response to trade policy is novel to the best of our knowledge. 17
IV. Data Description
While the model of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) , and Baier and Bergstrand's (2009) approximation thereof, can be used for a gravity model-based quantification of the trade friction impact on trade volumes in general, previous work focused on the estimation of border effects. 18 By way of contrast, our goal is to analyze the bilateral and multilateral responses of trade volumes to trade impediments in general and AD investigations in particular.
A. Trade Volumes and GDP
We use bilateral export volumes (X ijt ) and exporter as well as importer GDPs (Y it , Y jt ) as published by the IMF. The corresponding figures are expressed in nominal U.S. dollars. Exports span the period from 1948 to 2001 and GDPs from 1960 to 2001 at the annual level. Bilateral export data are based on the Direction of Trade statistics, and GDP is available from the International Financial Statistics. In most of the models we estimate, using GDPs is not necessary, since they may be controlled for by fixed country time effects. Then the sample period covers the period from 1948 to 2001. In specifications that employ GDPs, the sample period runs from 1960 to 2001.
B. Geographical and Cultural Trade Frictions
Geographical trade frictions are well known for their robust negative impact on bilateral trade flows. In particular, geographical distance and (the absence of) common borders should be mentioned here (Bergstrand, 1985 (Bergstrand, , 1989 Anderson & Van Wincoop, 2004) . We compute bilateral great circle distances (DIST ij ) between two countries' capitals based on the longitude and latitude as published in the CIA World Factbook. The same source provides information on a country's common borders with other economies. Since our focus is on trade frictions, we depart from previous research by designing a dummy variable that takes the value 1 in the absence of a common border and 0 otherwise (NBORD ij ). Furthermore, we follow the same principle by defining a cultural (language) distance variable that is 1 in the absence of a common official language and 0 otherwise (NLANG ij ).
C. Political Trade Frictions: Regional Trade Agreements and Antidumping Investigations
We use several different binary political trade friction indicators. Most important for the purposes of this paper, we employ variables giving the number of AD investigations of an importer against its exporting trading partner. 19 We use this information on AD activity to construct two variables (and lags thereof) for use in our empirical models. The first is a count variable reflecting the number of AD investigations importing country j has initiated against exporting country i in year t (AD ijt ). We expect the parameter of AD ijt to be negative if concurrent AD investigations impede exports of a country whose firms have been filed on. In addition, we allow for a separate impact of an accumulation of investigations at the country pair level. Specifically, we use the cumulative number of AD investigations for a country pair, indicating how many AD investigations economy j has launched against country i until year t (CAD ijt ). This would reflect a particularly long memory in trade response to earlier investigations.
Following other work, we use information on (the absence of) common regional trade agreement membership for each country pair and year-one for customs unions (NCU ijt ) and the other one for free trade areas (NFTA ijt ) as notified to the WTO. 20
D. Definition of the Trade Friction Variable t ijt
While we used a single symbol t ijt for trade costs in section III, the preceding subsections suggest that t ijt is an aggregate 19 Data on antidumping investigations are collected from various sources. First, we take advantage of Chad Bown's series of antidumping cases from the year 1980 onward. The data are available as tables at http:// people.brandeis.edu/˜cbown/global_ad/. In fact, much more information is available there than we make use of, and these data may be a rich source for future research.
In addition to Bown's data, we have compiled data on bilateral antidumping investigations before 1980. In particular, data on the European Union's (then, the European Community's) investigations are collected in the appendix to Beseler and Williams (1986) . The data on Australia, South Africa, United Kingdom, and the United States stem from the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), in particular the supplement to its Basic Instruments and Selected Documents and national sources, for example: Australian Customs Service, Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, the DTI (for South Africa), and other countries' agencies. Bruce Blonigen provides Web links on his homepage to a set of countries' administrative offices (pages.uoregon.edu/bruceb).
Unlike statutory tariffs, contingent protection is characterized by a multitude of details in implementation that vary across sectors, countries, and time. It would be nice to have access to data that control for this variability. However, like all other analyses dealing with cross-sectoral, cross-national, and cross-temporal contingent protection, we are constrained to work with count data. As with all other papers that share this problem, we hope (with more-or-less justification) that any biases imported in this fashion are small.
Note that Zanardi (2006) provides information at the unilateral level by summarizing the investigations at the investigator country level as available from the GATT's supplement to its Basic Instruments and Selected Documents publication. While Zanardi's article is a rich source as well, it is not useful for our purpose due to the absence of country pair information for investigations. 20 In the sensitivity analysis summarized in table 2, we allow for a further impact of other preferential trade agreements notified to the WTO, WTO nonmembership of either one or two countries of a pair, and the absence of currency arrangements such as currency union, currency peg, or currency band membership as documented by the IMF. Also, we consider the role of once-and twice-lagged antidumping (AD ij,t−1 , AD ij,t−2 , CAD ij,t−1 , CAD ij,t−2 ), and, finally, we use an exporter's antidumping investigations against the importer (AD jit , CAD jit ) as additional control variables there to capture dynamic effects of antidumping and the sluggish response of trade flows to antidumping. and NLANG ij . 21 In the aggregation, we follow the literature by assuming a log-linear functional form,
Following Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) , we use ln
To implement the Baier-Bergstrand approximation, for each variable in ln t ijt we collect terms in equation (9) into a variable indicated by a tilde. For instance, the term corresponding to ln DIST ij is the first-order Taylor series approximation evaluated at an equilibrium with symmetric but nonzero trade frictions as in equation (9), which reads ln
and similarly for all other trade barrier variables. Note that the latter approximation reveals an analogy to the two-way panel data within estimator (here, with fixed exporter-by-time and importer-by-time effects). Variable ln DIST ij is defined as the exporter-by-year and importer-by-year demeaned DIST ij , and similarly for the other trade barrier variables. The only difference by comparison to the two-way within model is that the left-hand-side variable is not demeaned in the Baier and Bergstrand (2009) approach.
Inserting equation (11) in equation (9) and using the above definitions yields
The specification in equation (12) could be estimated by adding ln Y W ,t to both sides of the model or, in a less restrictive approach, replacing − ln Y W ,t by fixed time effects. 22 If the number of country pairs in the data is as large as in our application, one can apply a country pair within estimator to eliminate the possible correlation of the covariates with μ ij . The parameter estimates α k for k = 1, . . . , 4 are then the fixed effects benchmark coefficients.
V. Panel Data Estimates of the Impact of Antidumping Investigations on Trade Volumes

A. Baseline Results
In the empirical analysis, we proceed in two steps. First, we estimate the counterpart to equation (12) that uses nondemeaned trade friction variables on the right-hand side. While this model accounts for the possible influence of time-invariant variables, it ignores the impact of multilateral resistance on trade volume. 23 Second, we summarize the findings of the transformed model as in equation (12). A comparison of the corresponding model outcome with that based on the properly demeaned model sheds light on the importance of multilateral versus bilateral effects of trade frictions on trade volume in general and of AD in particular. The null hypothesis of a zero impact of multilateral resistance is even testable.
We run each of these two models by pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) and the fixed country-pair effects estimator. Pooled OLS assumes that the included explanatory variables are uncorrelated with the time-invariant unobservables that are collected in the between-error term (μ ij ) while the fixedeffects model does not. Since the geographical and cultural variables in the model (ln DIST ij , NBORD ij , NLANG ij ) are time invariant, they will be wiped out by the fixed country pair effects estimator so that their coefficients are reported only with pooled OLS. Table 1 provides a summary of results for the four models. The results suggest the following conclusions. First, the test statistics reject the pooled OLS models A and C against their fixed country pair effects counterparts B and D. Second, models A and B ignore the role of multilateral resistance and are rejected against their cum-multilateral-resistanceterm counterparts, models C and D. Since model D is clearly preferable on econometric grounds over models A to C, we focus on the discussion of the corresponding parameters in the sequel.
The point estimates for the parameter of AD ijt indicate that a single AD investigation exerts a significantly negative, contemporaneous, direct impact on bilateral exports of about e −0.073 −7.03%. 24 According to the much smaller (in absolute value) and insignificant parameter of CAD ijt , there is no indication of a long memory in trade responsiveness to AD in that model. Hence, investigations of an importer against an exporter in the past do not impede concurrent trade volume. 23 With panel data, the multilateral resistance terms can principally be captured by fixed exporter-by-time and importer-by-time effects. See Baltagi, Egger, and Pfaffermayr (2003) for such a model. However, with a large data set such as ours, this involves a huge matrix of dummy variables that is infeasible to handle by standard computer hardware. 24 This magnitude may strike the reader as quite large. However, note that this reflects only the direct impact of AD ijt on trade flows within an overall highly nonlinear framework. A valid quantification of the effect of antidumping investigations is quite tricky, here, since we have to compute the associated change of AD ijt through an increase in AD ijt for all country pairs. We pursue this explicitly in section VD, where we will see that this ends up being a very small effect. −0.133 0.051 * * * 0.011 0.005 * * (iii) As in ii plus twice lagged antidumping measures c −0.131 0.059 * * 0.015 0.009 * * (iv) As in iii plus AD and CAD of exporter d −0.134 0.063 * * 0.013 0.007 * * (v) As in iv but accounting for systematically missing trade flows e −0.135 0.048 * * * 0.013 0.008 * (vi) As in iv but using levels (incl. zeros) rather than the log of exports in a poisson QML model f −0.212 0.041 * * * 0.010 0.006 (vii) As in iv but using impositions of AD measures instead of investigations g −0.107 0.052 * * 0.002 0.002 (viii) As in iv but using GDP-weighted rather than unweighted averages for third-country effects h −0.046 0.027 * 0.017 0.007 * * All models include fixed country pair effects and fixed time effects. * * * , * * , and * * * : Significance levels of 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively. a Beyond model D in table 1, the specification icludes the following covariates: absence of WTO membership for one of the two countries; absence of WTO membership for both countries; absence of currency union membership; absence of currency peg membership; absence of currency band membership; absence of preferential (other than customs union of free trade area) membership.
b Beyond specification i, we include ADij,t−1 and CADij,t−1 (jointly significant at 5%). The above coefficients are the accumulated effects. c Beyond specification ii, we include ADij,t−2 and CADij,t−2 (jointly significant at 5%). The above coefficients are the accumulated effects. d Beyond specification iii, we include the exporter's ADjit and CADjit (jointly significant at 1%). e We apply Wooldridge's (1995) sample selection estimator for panel data. We estimate annual selection models using the following determinants of the indicator for nonmissing/nonzero exports: all variables as in specification iv in this table; the means of these variables; time-invariant geographical determinants such as common language, adjacency, log distance, log area of exporter plus importer, location on a common continent, and their demeaned counterparts to account for multilateral resistance as in equation (12). There is an inverse Mill's ratio for each year. The inverse Mill's ratios are jointly significant at 1%. f This model follows the suggestion of Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) by using a quasi-maximum likelihood Poisson model with robust standard errors, but with country pair fixed effects. Since this specification includes 0 trade flows, we cover 882,451 observations in this case. While the point estimate in this model turns out to be larger than that in iv, the two confidence intervals overlap enough so that the parameters for AD and CAD are not significantly different between iv and vi.
g The data are provided by Chad Bown and available only from 1980 onward. The total number of observations is 85,052, and there are 9,744 country pairs. Other than using impositions rather than investigations, the estimated specification is the same as that in iv in this table.
h See Baier and Bergstrand (2009) for this alternative approximation of the model by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) . The exporter's antidumping investigations are jointly significant in this model. i The figures for specifications i-vii are bootstrapped standard errors.
B. Sensitivity Analysis
Before turning to the quantification of the impact of AD investigations on trade volume, we provide a sensitivity analysis of the baseline estimates in table 1. Overall, we provide nine alternative sets of results for the parameters of interest (those of AD ijt and CAD ijt ). Our findings are summarized in table 2A.
Experiment i-including further trade friction variables.
In a first step, we augment our specification of model D by six additional covariates related to trade frictions: absence of preferential (other than customs union of free trade area) membership; absence of WTO membership for one of the two countries; absence of WTO membership for both countries; absence of currency union membership; and absence of currency peg membership; absence of currency band membership. Most of these variables have been shown to affect trade volumes. As we noted in section I, all of these variables have been shown, at least in some analyses, to significantly affect trade patterns. Indeed, we find that these variables exert a jointly significant (at 1%) impact on bilateral exports. However, their omission does not influence the point estimates of the parameters of interest, β AD ijt and β CAD ijt .
Experiments ii and iii-dynamic effects of antidumping. By including CAD ijt along with AD ijt , model D accounts for a dynamic effect of AD on trade volume but in a very crude way. In experiment ii, we include once-lagged levels of our AD variables (AD ij,t−1 , CAD ij,t−1 ) to the specification in experiment i, and in experiment iii, we additionally include the twice-lagged levels thereof (AD ij,t−2 , CAD ij,t−2 ). Hence, these specifications capture the time-variant influence of contemporaneous versus lagged AD investigations as in autoregressive distributed lag models. 25 Since we are interested in the long-run effects of AD, we report its cumulated impact with these two experiments: β AD ijt + β AD ij,t−1 (+β AD ij,t−2 ) and β CAD ijt + β CAD ij,t−1 (+β CAD ij,t−2 ), respectively. We find that the fixed effects estimator of model D substantially underestimates the impact of both current and cumulative investigations; however, we also find that the inclusion of a second lag provides essentially no additional impact on trade volume. 26 Experiment iv-the exporter's investigations and their impact on bilateral export volume. In the next experiment, we include the exporter's AD investigation variables AD jit and CAD jit , respectively, in addition to the covariates in experiment iii. We do so to make sure that we do not ascribe an effect to the importer's investigations that in fact is due to exporter activity. Again, these two variables contribute significantly to the explanation of bilateral, normalized export volume. However, the parameters of interest are not statistically different from those in experiment iii, as can be seen from the point estimates and the t-statistics reported in table 2.
Experiment v-systematically missing trade values.
Research provides an explanation of zero trade among trading partners with particular characteristics (Evenett & Venables, 2002; Felbermayr & Kohler, 2006; Helpman, Melitz, & Rubinstein, 2008) . With a log-linear model like ours, the dependent variable may be missing for three reasons: bilateral trade is truly, 0, bilateral trade values are not reported 27 or GDP values are not available. As a result, selection into the sample might lead to a biased impact of the AD investigation parameters of interest. We check for the sensitivity of the findings by correcting the specification as in experiment iv for sample selection bias. 28 We follow Wooldridge (1995) by applying a sample selection model that is suitable for panel data with fixed effects. 29 This model rests on inverse Mill's ratios as selection correction variables that are based on annual probit models. These probit models employ the multilateral resistance transformed and untransformed variables as in experiment iv and time-invariant geographical and cultural determinants (see note f in table 2 for details). In all years, these variables possess high joint relevance (they are significant at 1% throughout). A test of sample selection following Wooldridge (1995) indicates that there is significant (at 1%) selection into the sample conditional on this specification. However, there is little impact on the point estimates of the parameters of interest.
Experiment vi-accounting for 0 trade flows in a Poisson
quasi-maximum-likelihood model. Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) have suggested accounting for 0 bilateral trade flows in a Poisson model. There, only the right-hand side of the specification is logarithmically transformed, not the dependent variable. Hence, 0 trade flows are not dropped by log-transforming the model. In our data set, there are 588,095 0 bilateral export values across all years. Hence, the number of observations in the Poisson model is 882,451, while it was only 294,356 in the log-export-based specifications. For the sake of consistent estimates, we follow the Mundlak-Chamberlain device and include country pair means of all explanatory variables in the model, along with the original variables. 30 This leads to parameter estimates for the original variables that are to be interpreted as within-country pair estimates as in the previous models. Additionally, the estimates are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors as suggested by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) . The estimated impact of AD and CAD is similar to the baseline results. While the point estimate for the impact of AD on bilateral exports is higher than before, the parameter is not significantly different from the original estimates. 27 Zero trade and missing trade values are typically not satisfactorily distinguishable in trade matrices. 28 We do not use the model as of experiment v since the use of GDP in the selection model leads to an unnecessary loss of observations. 29 Cross-section procedures as in Helpman et al. (2008) or Felbermayr and Kohler (2006) are not applicable in this case, as Wooldridge (1995) pointed out. 30 Mundlak (1978) , Chamberlain (1984) , and Wooldridge (2002) suggest parameterizing the fixed effects in panel data models as an additive function of all time-averaged variables in the model. Unlike the dummy variables estimator, this procedure is applicable to both linear and nonlinear models, and it produces consistent parameter estimates even if some of the timevariant variables in the model are correlated with time-invariant unobserved effects.
Experiment vii-using the number of impositions of preliminary antidumping measures instead of the investigations.
We might reasonably expect that the primary effect of AD on trade comes only with the actual imposition of AD duties. Unfortunately, neither Bown's data (which begin in 1980) nor the data we have been able to collect permit us to treat this question over the entire GATT/WTO time period. Thus, as an additional experiment, we consider the subperiod from 1980. Interestingly, the results point to a somewhat smaller point estimate of the long-run impact of impositions than for investigations for the longer time span. However, the parameter estimates are not significantly different between experiments iv and vi. 31
Experiments viii-using GDP-weighted rather than simple averages in the Baier and Bergstrand (2009) approach to account for multilateral resistance. Baier and Bergstrand suggest an alternative specification of multilateral resistance, where the original trade friction variables are not transformed by subtracting simple exporter and importer means but rather GDP-weighted ones. The latter transformation is associated with a Taylor series approximation around the 0 trade friction equilibrium. This specification leads to a lower point estimate of the AD impact. However, this effect is estimated at less precision than the original ones so that it is not significantly different from the baseline estimates.
Based on the analysis in this section, we will generally use the specification in experiment iv as our main framework. In addition, we will compare the results from this specification against ones that are based on applied measures as in experiment vii.
C. Discussion of Hypotheses on Trade Volume Effects of Antidumping
In section II, we presented four broad classes of channel that the literature on AD has identified as affecting trade volumes: direct protection effects, effects due to the contingent nature of protection, effects due to the non-MFN nature of protection, and effects due to the firm-specific nature of protection. In section III, we developed the model that resulted in our empirical specification in equation (12). In this section, we express the predicted effects as hypotheses of this model and present some estimates of these effects. Section VD will present our analysis of the quantitative magnitude of the major effects.
The most obvious implementation of our key question is to ask whether the use of AD by country j on the imports from country i (implemented as exports from i to j) reduces the volume of those imports. In terms of the specification in equation (12), this implies that α 1 < 0. As the estimates 31 One explanation for this may be the high correlation between nontransformed and transformed antidumping investigations and the impositions of antidumping measures. The correlation coefficients amount to 0.64 and 0.62 (impositions), respectively. reported in table 2 suggest, we find a statistically significant negative effect of AD in the year of initiation. In our sensitivity analysis, we also considered one-and two-period lags of AD, both of them significant. More important, it is clear that inclusion of one lag is necessary to capture the effects of AD on trade in a given period, but that the second lag contributes little to the analysis. Because the data on applied measures are not available for many countries over the entire time period of interest, we have defined our AD (and CAD) variables in terms of initiations. Given data availability and a reasonably high correlation between initiations and application of duties, this seems a sensible strategy. However, experiment iv directly examines the number of cases in which duties were applied as a robustness check. Consistent with our expectations, α 1 is negative and statistically significant with a magnitude roughly similar (in fact, slightly smaller) to the value of the parameter estimated in our baseline specification estimated on initiations. 32 It is interesting to note that the coefficient on our CAD variable, α 2 , is greater than 0. This variable is intended to pick up the long-run effects of AD in the relevant dyad. We capture the contemporaneous, the once-lagged, and the twice-lagged impact in α 1 , so countries that applied many AD measures in the past now have fewer of them. 33 For the overall impact of AD, note that a country's cumulative number of AD actions grows by definition, while contemporaneous ADs may increase or fall over time. Altogether, the cumulative impact (through α 2 ) reduces the contemporaneous one. The smaller the change relative to a dyad's average number of AD actions across the years in a given time span, the smaller is the reduction of the direct impact of AD (through α 1 ; for a given dyadic change in AD over time) by that of the cumulative one (through α 2 ). Hence, α 2 × CAD reduces the impact of α 1 ×AD, and this reduction depends on the level and change in both AD and CAD. 34 This effect might be picking up some of the retaliation effects, which we consider explicitly below.
A second set of hypotheses relates to the firm-specific effects of AD protection. We considered two broad arguments here: harassment and strategic effects. In the case of harassment, we would expect the effect to flow from initiation, so we can use our full data set. The hypothesis would be α 1 < 0. In the case of strategic effects, it is not clear 32 Using data from Bown's data set covering the period 1980-2001, we also considered specifications in which AD was implemented as each component: duties, suspension agreements, and price undertakings. For specifications involving the contemporaneous values, we considered one and two lags of these variables. With the exception of a specification in which two lags of price undertakings were considered, none of these achieved conventional levels of significance. The specification involving one and two lags of the price-undertaking variable was significantly negative, though the cumulative impact of the two lags was not significant. Full results are available on request. 33 This is precisely the pattern found by Zanardi (2006) , where both initiations and implementations by traditional users have declined over time while use by new users has increased dramatically. 34 Since our framework explicitly incorporates multilateral resistance, the overall impact of AD activity (both contemporaneous and cumulative) also depends on what happens in the other dyads.
whether we should be focusing on initiations or implementations, but in either case, the hypothesis is α 1 < 0. As with the hypothesis of general direct effects, we find a statistically significant negative impact of both initiation and implementation. Since these three hypotheses make observationally equivalent predictions, our results do not allow us to choose among hypotheses. 35 We can, however, consider the magnitudes involved. We consider this in the next section.
A third set of hypotheses derives from the non-MFN nature of AD protection. The essential issue here is trade diversion. In thinking about trade diversion in the context of a gravity model, there are several important things to note. First, the direct impact of a country's AD investigations on dyadic exports, given everybody else's actions, is identical to the parameter in table 2 (of course, our left-hand-side variable is in logs, so the elasticity in percent would be about 100 × (e α 1 −Var(α 1 ) − 1). 36 Second, the impact on the average dyadic number of AD investigations for the average exporter in year t is quite small, as is that on the average dyadic number of AD investigations for the average importer. The impact on the overall average dyadic number of AD investigations for all pairs is even smaller. The negative of the change in exporterby-time average number of AD investigations minus that of the importer-by-time average number of AD investigations plus that of the time average number of AD investigations is the third-country change, that is, Δ(−AD ·jt − AD i·t + AD ·t ), where Δ is the first difference operator. Recall that, in contrast to the following table, we are talking about the marginal impact of a single AD investigation on bilateral trade here. Clearly the direct impact of AD on trade is captured by α 1 ΔAD ijt = α 1 from which it follows that the effect due to multilateral resistance is α 1 Δ(−AD ·jt − AD i·t + AD ·t ) < 1. Since the parameter for both effects is the same, the diversion effect is smaller than the creation effect (of course, since α 1 < 0, here, we face a negative creation effect). Beyond that, we may say that with a worldwide increase of use, the diversion effect will decline, since the means will be affected less than before by a unitary increase of a single country's AD investigations but the direct effect is always multiplied 35 As we noted in section II, for strategic effects to be macroeconomically significant (and thus show up in analysis of the sort we consider here) would require implausible market structure conditions at the global level. The empirical work that speaks directly to this issue would seem to be unsupportive of the existence of such market structures (Shin, 1998) . Furthermore, the work we report in section VII, on the most significant sectors, where such market structures might exist and might affect aggregate outcome, does not find evidence of difference between these sectors and the aggregate.
Harassment is a somewhat different story. Empirical research, especially by Staiger and Wolak (1994, 1996) , has found some some evidence of harrassment. While Staiger and Wolak find evidence of harassment effects and the presence of participants in the process who are primarily interested in those effects ("process filers"), they ultimately conclude that "for most industries, the prospect of a dumping finding is an important ingredient in the decision to file and thus that outcome filers are the predominant users of antidumping law" (1994, p. 53) . Overall, we are predisposed to believe that the effects we have identified flow from direct effects. 36 Note that the effect of a unitary change in AD on exports is not well approximated by 100 × (e α1 − 1) in a semi-log model as indicated by Van Garderen and Shah (2002) . Case 4: Using the specification as in iii of table 2 plus a retaliation dummy that is unity if the exporter used AD investigations against the importer in year t or any other year before Variable
Retaliation dummy ijt 0.204 0.161 AD ijt −0.139 0.039 * * CAD ijt 0.014 0.004 * * Case 5: Using the specification as in iii of table 2 plus a retaliation dummy that is unity if the exporter used AD investigations against the importer in year t or any other year before interacted with the number of AD investigations a Variable
Retaliation dummy ijt 0.040 0.060 AD ijt −0.139 0.041 * * CAD ijt 0.014 0.004 * * Case 6: Using the specification as in iv of table 2 plus a retaliation dummy that is unity if the exporter used AD investigations against the importer in year t or any other year before Variable
Retaliation dummy ijt 0.026 0.165 AD ijt −0.135 0.040 * * CAD ijt 0.013 0.005 * * Case 7: Using the specification as in iv of table 2 plus a retaliation dummy that is unity if the exporter used AD investigations against the importer in year t or any other year before interacted with the number of AD investigations a Variable
Retaliation dummy ijt −0.011 0.061 AD ijt −0.132 0.044 * * CAD ijt 0.013 0.004 * * Case 8: Using the specification as in iv of table 2 plus three dummies: AD-law adoption of exporter; AD-law adoption of importer and the interactive term of the two. The dummies are set at 1 in any year of AD-law adoption and thereafter Variable
Exporter's AD law dummy 14.743 3.276 * * * Importer's AD law dummy −7.422 3.284 * * Interaction effect of exporter and importer AD-law dummy (both apply the law) 0.023 0.032 AD ijt −0.135 0.039 * * CAD ijt 0.013 0.004 * * All models include fixed country pair effects and fixed time effects. * * * , * * , and * : Significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. a The exporter's AD investigations are included as well, and they enter significantly at 1%. Hence, the exporter's investigations matter, but not in a way that is interrelated with the importer's investigations as presumed in the retaliation literature.
by ΔAD ijt = 1. The latter has some interesting implications. For instance, if there is a clustered entry into the group of AD users, the diversion effect for a single country is smaller in the phase of clustered entry, while it is relatively larger in a phase without clustered entry and usage. On the other hand, the worldwide overall diversion effect is then large, since all countries together have a sizable impact on the change of the means.
A third set of hypotheses involves contingent protection effects, or what Vandenbussche and Zanardi (2006) call the "global chilling effect"-the effect on all trading partners of AD protection levied on any trading partner. In table 3A we report three specifications in the spirit of Vandenbussdre and Zanardi, using the sum of all AD initiations by country j against any country in year t, in addition to the dyad-by-year specific terms (table 3A, case 1); using the sum of all AD implementations by country j against any country in year t, in addition to the dyad-by-year specific terms (table 3A, case 2); and introducing both of these variables at the same time (table 3A, case 3) . 37 That is, we consider AD jt and CAD jt in addition to AD ijt and CAD ijt . In no case are these variables significant, and the sign pattern among specifications is also unstable. Thus, we find no evidence in favor of global chilling.
Retaliation is a more complex direct effect of AD. We saw in section II that retaliation has both a trade-reducing and a trade-increasing effect and that these effects might be conveyed by simply adopting an AD mechanism-by initiation or by implementation (or both). Thus, we consider a number of specifications. Specifically, we construct a dummy that takes the value of unity if the exporter (country i) initiated an AD action against the importer (country j) in period t or any other year before. We also consider this variable interacted with the number of AD actions. We then use these variables in both specifications iii and iv (table 3B, cases 4-7). It turns out not only that these new variables are not significant, but as the first four cases in table 3B show, the values of α 1 and α 2 are essentially unchanged. Finally, we consider a specification with three dummy variables: one each for whether the importer and exporter possess an AD mechanism (variable takes a value of unity if yes) and an interaction term if both possess an AD mechanism (table 3B, case 8). If retaliation were significant, we would expect the interaction term to be significant. 38 This is not the case. Thus, unless we want to consider CAD and α 2 × CAD as evidence of retaliation, we find no evidence in favor of this hypothesis.
D. Quantification of the Antidumping Effect on Trade Volume between 1960 and 2000
Because we expect AD activity to affect long-run as well as current trade, we use the model as in experiment iv of table 2 to quantify the impact on exports among the covered economies. For this, we compare the contribution of AD alone to the predicted change in various aggregates of the normalized export volume between 1960 and 2000. Denote the predicted change in normalized exports by Δ lnx ij ≡ lnx ij,2000 − lnx ij,1960 and the corresponding counterfactual change, where AD ij,2000 and CAD ij,2000 (and their lags) are replaced by AD ij,1960 and CAD ij,1960 (and their lags) in lnx ij,2000 . Denote the corresponding counterfactual change by (Δ lnx ij,c ) . The difference between the two, Δ lnx ij − Δ lnx ij,c is an estimate of the impact of AD investigations on trade between 1960 and 2000. The overall impact on export volume is the net effect of recent (AD) and past (CAD) changes in the number of investigations.
We consider the effect of AD investigations on three different averages of world trade volume: the average country pair in the sample (trade weighted); the average (trade-weighted) country pair with an investigation importer (being defined as one where the cumulative number of investigations is greater than 0 in the year 2000, CAD ij,2000 > 0); and the 38 The individual dummies take the same signs as the count variables tapping the same policies. Note that, again, the parameters of the AD and CAD variables are essentially unchanged.
(trade-weighted) average impact on country-pairs where the importer has never investigated (CAD ij,2000 = 0) . Table 4 summarizes our findings.
The table suggests that the impact on exports is rather small. The reason for this is that, on average, AD ij,1960 , AD ij,2000 , CAD ij,1960 , CAD ij,2000 , and, most important, their changes are rather small (see table A1 in the Table Appen dix) . For the average country pair, the decline in bilateral exports between 1960 and 2000 that is attributable to AD investigations is slightly more than one-tenth of a percentage point. Of this, about 80% is due to the direct effect of bilateral AD rather than multilateral resistance. However, multilateral resistance tends to raise the impact and, on average, works in the same direction as the direct effect. Exports into AD-applying importers declined by about 1.6 percentage points over the same four decades. For these pairs, multilateral resistance accounted for more than a third of the effect. Exports into non-AD-applying importers increased marginally by about a third of a percentage point, which was entirely due to multilateral resistance.
VI. Welfare Effects of Antidumping
In addition to calculating the effect on trade volumes, we can also use our structural framework to estimate the welfare effects of antidumping as the equivalent variation in percentage associated with an annual change in AD and CAD for country i. 39 For this, we define the estimated contribution of the kth trade friction variable to country i's predicted bilateral log exports to country j in the year t as β k ln t k,ij,t , according to equation (9). For instance, log bilateral trade due to contemporaneous antidumping would then be β AD AD ij,t . With unitary GDP coefficients, a prediction of GDP-normalized bilateral exports is then
According to the model assumptions, N j=1 X ij,t = Y i,t . Using antidumping variables as of t −1 but other trade frictions as of the year t to construct counterfactual trade frictions in logs as of t, referred to as β k ln t k,ij,t,c , we may estimate counterfactual bilateral exports ( X ij,t,c ) and GDP ( Y i,t,c = N j=1 X ij,t,c ). Then the equivalent variation which in this model corresponds to the change in real GDP, for country i in percentage according to the observed change in AD and CAD between 2000 and t evaluated at other variable levels as of the year t is defined as
where
1 1−σ is the consumer price index defined as in equation (8) and evaluated at original trade frictions in the year t. P i,t,c is similarly defined for counterfactual trade frictions. Since the elasticity of the substitution parameter is not estimated directly, we follow Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) by assuming a level of σ = 5. Under this assumption, we estimate an average annual welfare effect of antidumping that is about −0.01%. The average annual effect on AD-applying countries is about −0.05% percent and that on AD-nonapplying countries is about 0.002%, respectively. The maximum estimated annual welfare effect of AD amounts to less than 1.5%. The average annual reduction for the United States amounts to 0.06%. 40 The maximum estimated annual AD-induced reduction in welfare for the United States over the period 1960 to 2000 amounts to less than 0.23%. Hence, consistent with the small impact on trade flows, the estimated welfare effects of antidumping are small.
VII. Effects Antidumping on Bilateral Trade of Specific Product Groups
The unambiguous result of our main analysis is that antidumping has small aggregate effects on trade and small aggregate welfare effects. That said, it is certainly the case that due to the high dumping margins and concentration on a small number of sectors, the microeconomic effects can be quite significant. More important for our purposes, as noted in notes 12 and 34, if these sectors (which might well be characterized by some form of oligopolistic interaction) are characterized by a distinctive response to antidumping, we might take that as evidence that such microeconomic interactions have significant macroeconomic effects. Thus, in this section, we pursue a sector-level analysis of sectors characterized by high levels of antidumping activity. It is widely known that antidumping by both developed and developing countries falls particularly heavily on the steel and chemical sectors (Bown, 2009) .
For an analysis of the consequences of antidumping on specific product classes, we must use trade data from a different source. We employ data of bilateral exports, which are classified according to Revision 2 of the Standard International Trade Classification from the U.N. World Trade Database. 40 The only other estimate of the welfare effect of antidumping that we know of is that of Gallaway et al. (1999) . As we note above, they estimate that antidumping in 1993 reduced U.S. welfare a maximum of 0.06% (a $2 billion to $4 billion welfare reduction in a year where U.S. GDP was estimated to be $6.7 trillion). This is remarkably close to our average annual estimate for the United States. In any event, both estimates are very small.
In particular, we use bilateral exports of products in three two-digit categories: Chemicals excluding Pharmaceuticals (category 52), Iron and Steel (category 67), and Other Metals (category 68). In order to assess the impact of antidumping on trade with these specific products, we had to merge the antidumping data by case, as collected by Bown, with the trade data. Fortunately, Bown's antidumping database contains the specific product measures applied so that such a match between data sources was possible. After merging the trade and antidumping data, we obtain a panel data set of 10,201 country pairs, which we observe annually over the years 1980 to 2004. In that data set, antidumping measures are quite concentrated on the products just mentioned: the three product groups together account for about 64% of all antidumping cases for the countries and years in the sample. Of the 64%, about 28 percentage points are contributed by Chemicals and by Iron and Steel each, and Other Metals make up for the rest of it. However, while Chemicals, Iron and Steel, and Other Metals are quite important when it comes to the use of dumping and antidumping, they account for less than 10% of total exports in the sample. 41 How does antidumping affect trade in the three product categories? To shed light on this matter, let us estimate Poisson QMLE models as in experiment vi of table 2. 42 Table  5 summarizes the associated findings by focusing on the antidumping measures AD and CAD only, akin to table 3. 43 Before turning to the discussion of the estimated effects themselves, a few remarks are in order. First, although we allow the dependent variable to be 0 in general, the number of observations and country-pairs differs across the three product categories. The reason lies in the fact that we may exclude country pairs from the sample if they never traded goods in a specific category in any of the years between 1980 and 2004 without any effect on the results. This is because we employ fixed-effects Poisson QMLE, which conditions on those country pairs that displayed some change in trade over the years. Therefore, the number of country pairs varies between 8,958 and 10,201 in the table, and the number of observations varies between 223,950 and 255,025, respectively. Second, while observations may be excluded from the regressions for statistical reasons, the calculation of multilateral resistance terms has to and does rely on the full sample of country pairs and years. 44 Third, similar to aggregate trade flows, fixed effects and multilateral resistance terms 41 This makes us even more confident about our identification of modest aggregate effects of antidumping: a large concentration of antidumping measures applied to what appears to be a tiny fraction of total trade would unlikely cause large aggregate effects. 42 Notice that we do not use linear regressions here for good reason: at the product level, the problems of zero trade and heteroskedasticity become even more important than in the aggregate. Therefore, it seems even more advisable to resort to nonlinear QMLE estimation with the disaggregated data at hand than with aggregate bilateral trade flows. 43 Since the models are estimated by Poisson QMLE, the test statistics reported on in the table are χ 2 -statistics rather than F-statistics. 44 Obviously zero bilateral trade implies that the corresponding weights for trade frictions in calculating the averages across exporters and importers have to be set to 0. are statistically significantly different from 0 and should not be ignored.
As to the impact of AD and CAD on bilateral exports in year t, notice that we allow for a distributed impact across three years as in experiment vi of table 2, where both AD and CAD of years t, t − 1, and t − 2 are allowed to matter for exports in t. What we report in table 5 is the joint (that is, accumulated long-run) effect of the corresponding measures in the three periods together, as in table 2. Similarly, the standard errors to the right of the long-run coefficients refer to the long-run impact.
The estimated long-run effects in table 5 suggest the following conclusions. First, the point estimates for AD are somewhat lower than the reference estimate for aggregate trade flows in the longer panel as in experiment vi of table 2 (the corresponding parameter was −0.212, there), but they are similar to the ones of the linear models as in experiment iv of table 2 (the corresponding parameter was −0.134). The estimated effect is largest for Iron and Steel (amounting to −0.117) and smallest for Other Metals (amounting to −0.098), but the variance across the point estimates is quite small. The parameter estimates of CAD are positive as they were in the previous tables, and they range from 0.015 (for Chemicals) to 0.055 (for Other Metals). Altogether we may conclude that the responsiveness (in terms of parameter estimates) of trade to antidumping is similar in the three considered product categories, which are heavy users of antidumping. We note that this result is not consistent with macroeconomically significant strategic effects in any of these sectors. It is, however, important to note that antidumping is more harmful for industries engaging in the trade of these products than on average, since the use of dumping and antidumping measures is more extensive there: about 64% of initiated antidumping cases affect about 8% of all trade flows, while the remaining 36% are spread across product categories, which together account for 92% of total world exports.
Hence, we may conclude that antidumping is harmful for trade, in particular, of specific product categories such as Chemicals, Iron and Steel, or Other Metals. Yet the main damage of antidumping in the corresponding industries is brought about not by their greater responsiveness to the initiation of antidumping cases than in other industries but to the more frequent use of antidumping. However, on average these products account for a relatively small fraction of world trade so that potentially important effects on specific products turn out small when it comes to aggregate effects on trade flows, GDP, or welfare.
VIII. Effects of Antidumping on Bilateral Trade of Specific Subsamples of Countries or Product Groups
One problem with the results discussed so far may be that by pooling the data across a large number of quite heterogeneous countries, they conceal dramatically different coefficients on antidumping in specific subgroups of countries. While we are bound to focus on aggregate effects of antidumping and do not want to venture into too detailed an analysis of the heterogeneity of antidumping coefficients, an obvious question to ask is whether antidumping affects less developed countries differently from the developed ones in terms of the estimated coefficients. This seems reasonable to ask since the use of antidumping measures historically pertained mainly to developed countries against less developed ones. However, this pattern changed over the previous decade as countries such as Brazil, China, and India started using antidumping measures intensively.
To shed light on the issue of development status and trade responsiveness to antidumping, we may split the sample used in the previous tables according to some rule of thumb. Here, we apply the World Bank's classification of countries into high-income versus other economies. According to that classification, the sample used before consists of 54 high-income countries and 122 low-income economies (the classification of countries is available from the authors on request). Using this classification, we distinguish three types of country pairs: ones that involve high-income countries as both an exporter and an importer (1,570 country pairs and 22,390 observations), ones that involve a high-income exporter and a low-income importer or vice versa (7,062 country pairs and 96,174 observations), and ones that involve low-income countries both as an exporter and as an importer (7,812 country pairs and 102,516 observations). Table 6 summarizes the parameter estimates on antidumping and cumulative antidumping using the same technique, specification, and multilateral resistance terms (which are calculated from the full sample of countries) as in experiment vi of table 2. There are two remarkable findings in table 6. First, the point estimates of the effects of AD on bilateral exports across the three subsamples are very close to each other and close to the reference estimate in table 2, which was 0.212. However, the parameter estimate is not statistically different from 0 in the subsample of low-income countries only. The reason for the latter is that the corresponding parameter is estimated from a relatively small number of users and heteroskedasticity is quite pronounced within this subset of countries. Second, the point estimates of CAD are also relatively similar to both each other and the reference value, which was 0.010 (and not statistically significantly different from 0) in table 2. The estimate of CAD is not statistically different from 0 in the subsamples of high-income-only and low-income-only countries.
Overall, we may therefore conclude that what distinguishes the three considered subsamples from each other is not so much the degree of responsiveness of trade flows with regard to antidumping (in terms of parameter estimates) but the extent of antidumping initiations and the use of corresponding antidumping measures. Admittedly, there are stronger users of antidumping than the United States, and we would not want to give the impression that all countries would experience welfare effects of abandoning antidumping of the magnitude as the United States did. For comparison, let us compute the welfare costs of antidumping of India, a heavy user, with those of the United States. India used antidumping measures much more extensively than the United States did over the last decade covered by our sample (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) . Accordingly, the total direct impact of abandoning antidumping is bigger. However, abandoning antidumping has not only direct expansionary effects on trade but also indirect dampening effects through the multilateral resistance terms. Obviously the latter will not outweigh the former, but they cushion the detrimental effects of trade costs and reduce expansionary effects of trade liberalization and the reduction of protection. Altogether, this leads to predicted effects on India's welfare within the last decade of the sample of about 0.8% per annum. While this is about three times as large as the welfare effects on the United States, it is still small when keeping India's growth of trade and GDP over that period in mind.
IX. Conclusion
Overall our analysis suggests that the aggregate effects of AD in the context of the GATT/WTO system are modest. This should not be taken to imply that AD is not, or should not be, a matter of concern to the liberal international trading system. Given the magnitude of duties, the sectoral distortions can be sizable. In addition, the control of protection and the advance of liberalization are the centerpieces of that system, and AD protection is protection. At the same time, it does not seem useful to oversell the consequences of AD. Since it seems likely that contingent protection has played an important role in supporting trade liberalization, reflexive rejection seems particularly inappropriate.
This last point strikes us as important. As economists, our first line of response to AD is surely negative. We applaud the reductions in tariffs associated with various trade liberalizations but abhor the backsliding associated with administered protection. The moral language is used advisedly: most of us view liberalization as an act of moral courage and reversals as moral weakness. Close students of AD, however, have long been clear that the reality is considerably more complex. The effects on which this paper has focused are essentially microeffects. That is, they refer to the effects within country pairs (and, at least intuitively, are driven by firm-and sector-level effects). While such microeffects have been the focus of the great majority of both theoretical and empirical research on AD, systemwide (macro) effects have also been noted (Nelson, 2006) . The global chilling effect is in principle a macroeffect, but we were unable to find any evidence of its presence. Strongly positive macroeffects have also been commented on. From the very earliest research on AD (Viner, 1923) , it has been recognized that AD can be a central part of a political strategy to support liberalization. Finger and Nogues (2005) have provided strong case study evidence that at least in a number of Latin American countries engaged in liberalization episodes in the 1980s, AD was used in precisely this way. To the extent that the liberal trading system that began to emerge in the late 1930s and was institutionalized in the GATT/WTO system relied on U.S. leadership and that that leadership was conditional on the various reciprocal trade acts and their more modern descendants, it is clear that administered protection played a central role in underwriting the system as a whole. While such systemwide macroeffects are purely speculative, the generally small microeffects suggest at a minimum that we need much more information on the way contingent protection interacts with statutory protection and multilateral liberalization. The dependent variable is the log of bilaeral exports over exporter-times-importer GDP (mean = −46.2346; s.d. = 2.5988). In some of the regressions, we use the nondemeaned log exporter GDP (mean = 23.8455; s.d. = 2.3315) and log importer GDP (mean = 23.9068; s.d. = 2.2935) as additional control variables.
